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Abstract
This paper touches on some of the key
themes of the author's dissertation project. It
d is c u s s e s  iden t i ty c o n s t r u c t io n  in
constitutional discrimination claims and the
possibility of creating an anti-subordination
framework from fragments of the existing
C a n a d ia n  a n d  A m e r i c a n  e q u a l i t y
jurisprudence.
Résumé
Cet article touche sur quelques thèmes clés
du projet de dissertation de l'auteure. Il
discute de la construction de l'identité dans
le s  a l lé g a t io n s  d e  d is c r im in a t io n
constitutionnelle et la possibilité de créer un
cadre anti-subordination des fragments des
jurisprudences canadiennes et américaines
existantes sur l'égalité. 
Introduction
My dissertation investigates the ways
that both the Canadian and American
Constitutions use a mechanics of discipline in
order to construct, (re)produce and maintain
the cohesion of the social body. Those who
would pollute the purity of the national
narrative are contained through the regulation
of ability, sexuality and race; those who would
stop the reproduction of its members are
disciplined through state control of abortion,
sexuality and birth control. Constitutional
equality claims establish the meaning of
discrimination and thereby the borders of
intelligibility, thus playing a pivotal role in
creating the normative bodies that make up
the nation. This paper will touch on some of
the key themes of my dissertation project and
describe the possibility of constructing an
anti-subordination framework from elements
of the existing equality jurisprudence of both
jurisdictions. 
The statement "I have been
discriminated against because I am [insert
identity category here]" implies that the
discrimination is located inside my body.
Rephrased: "Because I am [insert identity
category here], I have been discriminated
against" implies a certain causal relationship
between what my body is and the
discrimination that occurred. If it is on the
basis of my identity that discrimination occurs,
it is on the basis of something within me that
the discrimination occurs. This, however, is
never the case. It is not what a person is but
rather what the person has been made to be
that is the essence of discrimination. Part of
my dissertation project is to flesh out an
alternative analytical framework from those
that are currently in use at the Supreme
Courts of Canada and the United States (US)
in constitutional equality claims. This
framework takes the discrimination out of the
claimant's body and relocates it within the
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actions that constitute discrimination, thereby
shifting the focus from the noun back on to
the  verb.  T h is  requ ires  re f ram ing
discrimination as a process that objectifies
people. It also requires an interrogation of
how this objectification in turn plays out in the
courts by making claimants only intelligible
according to the very criteria that objectified
them in the first place. 
Ian Haney López argues that the
United States Supreme Court is engaging in
"a principled refusal to recognize race in
public life" (López 2006, 48). This colourblind
jurisprudence reproduces racial inequality not
through the application of "a theory of racial
inferiority" but through an analysis of race "as
an abstract meaningless category" (López
2006, 48). In her dissent in Egan v. Canada,
Canadian Supreme Court Justice (as she was
then) Claire L'Heureux-Dubé forewarned that
an analysis that focuses on creating abstract
categories can ultimately end up bereft of a
substantive component that considers the
most important questions: what are the
effects of the policy and are they
discriminatory (Egan 1995, paragraphs
52-54)? At the outset, L'Heureux-Dubé J.'s
concern may appear to endorse a certain type
of liberal neutrality that could foster the
erasures and exclusions that I discuss. On
the surface it might seem as though she is
presenting a Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms  version of the type of1
jurisprudence that López is criticizing at the
US Suprem e Court. However, when
considering some of the notable regressions
at the Supreme Court of Canada  it becomes2
apparent that focusing too much on identity
can create the same preservation of inequality
that is the result of failing to consider the
power relations that emerge from historically
constructed meanings attached to identity. 
Angela Harris describes how this
phenomenon plays out in her account of the
similarities between Jorge Luis Borges'
fictional character Funes the Memorious  and3
the statutory construction of "W e, the People."
F u n e s  th e  M e m o r io u s  in h a b its  a
consciousness that denies generalities to the
point where community and commonality
become impossible. The metanarrative "W e,
the People" creates a social reality that denies
particularities to the degree that difference is
erased. A complete denial of generalities has
the same result as a complete denial of
particularities. The erasure of collective or
relational experiences ignores the possibilities
for collective or group identity formation and
identity formation through processes of
self-identification in relation to others. The
denial of particularities erases systemic forms
of group subordination, systemic exclusion
and the existence of unequal power relations
between and among people. Denying the
existence of differences and the denial of
identity-based collectivities creates erasures
within the larger singular collective of "W e, the
People" (Harris 1991). 
López describes race as being a
"magic word: say it and race suddenly springs
into being..." (López 2006, 49). This is what
Michel Foucault is getting at through his
methodology outlined in the Archeology of
Knowledge (Foucault 1972) and it provides a
useful framework for deconstructing the ways
in which the Canadian Charter cases foster
the same preservation of inequality as Funes
the Memorious's denial of generalities. It also
provides a way of deconstructing the
colourblindness that is a result of the narrative
of "W e, the People" present in many of the
US cases that López is referring to. The
narrative of "W e, the People," however, is by
no means limited to the US context nor is
Funes the Memorious limited to the Canadian
context. Although not explicitly written in the
Canadian Constitution, the metaphor: "W e,
the people," can be extended to the Canadian
context. The Canadian Supreme Court is also
engaged in constructing a singular social body
through the repetition of the phrase: "those
members of Canadian society equally
deserving of concern,  respect and
consideration" (Andrews 1989, 171; Egan
1995, paras 52-54; Law 1999, para. 42; Kapp
2008, para. 15). This occurs throughout the
equality jurisprudence surveyed in my
dissertation project. The difference between
the jurisdictions is how membership in the
singular polity is structured by the Court. 
Traces of "W e, the People" and
Funes the Memorious can be seen in all of
the cases that are under consideration here
and they can all be deconstructed according
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to Foucault's methodology. The construction
of the democratic polity as a singular group to
the exclusion and/or social marginalization of
those identified as other is a very important
feature of all of these cases. The
consideration of identity becomes the
determinant of the degrees of citizenship to
which the claimant(s) are entitled as a result
of their respective claims. W ithin the context
of the equality jurisprudence of both Canada
and the US, the over-determination of
particularities that Harris uses Funes the
Memorious to illustrate becomes the yardstick
for membership in the underdetermined
collectivity of "W e, the People."
According to Foucault, discourse
does not only reveal and describe: it creates
the objects of which it speaks (Foucault 1972,
49). The objects of discourse for my purposes
are the types of discrimination, the democratic
social body, and the bodies of the people
being discriminated against. W hat Foucault is
concerned with can be revealed through an
analysis of the discursive strategies used by
the courts and the outcomes generated in
Supreme Court decisions. Foucault is clear
about his intention to avoid a discussion of
subtext or revealing the unspoken. However,
in describing what is in the process of
becoming through discourse it is also possible
to describe what is not possible or intelligible
as a result of a set of rules that can only see
what they themselves create. These are the
effects of both the application of the analytical
frameworks and the respective identity
constructions created by the Supreme Courts
in each jurisdiction. 
The discursive strategies used by the
courts reveal the conditions of intelligibility
within the legal archive of constitutional law.
The US Supreme Court's colourblind
jurisprudence creates what López describes
as an "ethereal understanding of race" that
"disconnects race from social practices of
group conflict and subordination" (López
2006, 48). This can also be said of any
number of the other identity categories that
come into being in discrimination claims. It
can also be said of intersectional identities
and it can be seen in the Canadian context.
López's position, however, is that there is an
alternative interpretation that is rooted in an
anti-subordination framework constructed by
the US Supreme Court. Hernández v. Texas,
Brown v. Board of Education, and Perez v.
Sharp taken together may reveal a different
set of discursive strategies. I would also
include Justice Kennedy's opinion in
Lawrence v. Texas as a set of discursive
moves that m ight also contribute to this
framework. This framework makes it possible
to understand the objects of discourse
created in the courts differently. In this paper
I discuss aspects of these four cases and
inc lude e lem ents  o f the C anadian
jurisprudence taken from Andrews v. Law
Society of BC and Egan v. Canada. 
Registers of the Ban and Degrees of
Citizenship: Creating "We, the People" 
The legislation under review in
constitutional discrim ination claims is
generally engaged in the subjection of people
to various registers of the ban by relieving
them of degrees of citizenship. The figure of
Roman law, homo sacer, the one who cannot
be offered in ritual sacrifice but can be killed
and it will not be called a homicide, factors
into this picture insofar as homo sacer
embodies the bare life and is the result of the
epistemic violence inherent in the legal form
(Agamben 1998). The bare life is marked by
basic survival and basic subsistence, a life
subject to the extreme register of the ban
having no claim to legal rights. There are,
however, degrees of the ban and thereby a
variety of ways that traces of homo sacer
make an appearance in constitutional equality
claims. 
Giorgio Agamben begins his
investigation of homo sacer with a discussion
of the entry of the bare life into the sphere
where one can engage in living the bios
politikos (Agamben 1998). For both Plato and
Aristotle, zoe, the bare life, expresses the fact
of living driven by biological necessity, and
bios reflects a qualified, public or political life
(Agamben 1998, 1). W ithin this framework the
law has the power to define who is to become
bare life and to regulate those who are a part
of the political or qualified life. But, the bare
life and the political life only come into being
through rights discourse and the discursive
strategies used by the courts to create those
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who lead these lives. The bodies of those who
are part of "W e, the People" of the American
national narrative and those members of
Canadian society "equally deserving of
concern, respect and consideration" that
make up the "W e, the People" of Canadian
context do not pre-exist their entry into the
statist national narrative. Rather, they are
constructed through rights discourse. Here,
the law separates the political animals from
the bare life. Those reduced to the bare life
are both included in and excluded from the
larger collective of "W e, the People" existing
both inside and outside the law in a
relationship of simultaneity - insider alterity
(Agamben 1998, 110).
Agamben further discusses how the
exception becomes the norm through a
prolonged suspension of the normative
structure the exception is meant to reinforce.
Here, Carl Schmitt's discussion of the state's
power to create internal public enemies
becomes particularly important. Schmitt's
theory describes the state's attempt to
achieve internal unity through the creation of
an antagonistic other (Agamben 2005;
Schmitt 1966). The purpose of the state is not
only the capacity to use force against external
enemies but to prevent civil war by ensuring
that internal divisions never reach the capacity
to engage in the political friend/enemy relation
(Agamben 1998, 46-48; Schmitt 1966).
Schmitt's theory, however, is dependent on
the bodies of that declared enemy
pre-existing the declaration as a natural group
(Schmitt 1966). Because discourses create
the objects of which they speak, following
Foucault, I would argue that it is in the
moment of the declaration that the enemy and
the enemy's characteristics spring into being.
In order for legal norms to be valid,
they must establish the normal situation as
they lose their applicability in any abnormal
situation (Agamben 1998, 46-47). However,
just as Foucault theorizes that every moment
of opposition to the norm silently reinforces it
(Foucault 1990), the abnormal situation
paradoxically serves as a reinforcement of the
legal norm. Agamben discusses the US
Patriot Acts as examples of not only the
reification of Schmitt's category of the political
in all its capacity (the construction of both
internal and external enemies), but as
mechanisms through which the sovereign
invokes a permanent state of exception
(Agamben 2005). The rule fails to prevent
actions that under normal circumstances
would be unacceptable (Agamben 2005). As
such, homo sacer is replicated in the form of
the sovereign. The sovereign may be equal
before the law, subject to laws such as
treason and the criminal law, but is also
outside the law insofar as the sovereign is the
one who has suspended the functional
juridical apparatus. 
The US Appellate Court decision,
Perez v. Sharp and the British Columbia
Court of Appeal's decision in Andrews v. Law
Society of British Columbia are both
illustrative. Although neither case represents
the application of a state of exception, traces
of homo sacer appear in both California Chief
Justice Roger Traynor's 1948 opinion and
former British Columbia Court of Appeals
Judge Beverley McLachlin's 1986 decision.
Traynor C.J. invokes national emergencies,
the survival of the race and the figures of
those who would be excluded from the
sovereign "W e, the People." McLachlin J.A.
(as she was then) invokes "irrelevant personal
characteristics" that become a justification for
the internment of "enemy aliens in wartime"
(Andrews 1986 as cited in Andrews 1989).
Homo Sacer also makes an appearance at
the Supreme Court of Canada in the 1989
Andrews decision when the "discrete and
insular minorities" of the US jurisprudence
spring into being and the Court reiterates
McLachlin J.A.'s concerns about "enemy
aliens" (US v. Carolene Products Co.1938 as
cited in Andrews 1989). 
Perez v. Sharp is a case recognizing
that bans on interracial marriage violate the
equality provisions of the 14th Amendment.
Traynor C.J.'s opinion explicitly recognizes the
constructedness of racial categories, thereby
rendering distinctions made on the basis of
race, and in particular distinctions that rely on
percentages of racial make-up, invalid and
absurd. On the other hand, just as Traynor
C.J. deconstructs race, he also invokes the
word race as a surrogate for the sovereign in
the form of "W e, the people." He cites Skinner
v. Oklahoma  stating: "Marriage and4
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procreation are fundamental to the very
existence and survival of the race" (Perez
1948). "The race" simply stated can be
interpreted as the hum an race or,
alternatively, as that group of people that
exists within the regulatory boundaries of the
United States and in particular in California in
1948. Traynor C.J. then cites Hirabayashi v.
United States, the Japanese internment case,
in order to illustrate that in matters of national
emergency race can be used as a means to
contain an internal enem y although
miscegenation does not constitute such an
emergency. On the one hand, striking down
the anti-m iscegenation provisions of the
statute allows a white woman, Andrea Perez,
and a Black man, Sylvester Davis, to marry.
On the other, race can be invoked by the
Executive and Congress to intern Perez and
Davis on that very basis if a national
emergency were to be declared that
implicated their simultaneously constructed
a n d  i r r e l e v a n t ,  y e t
i m m u t a b l e - i n - t i m e s - o f - e m e r g e n c y ,
characteristics. 
Andrews v. Law Society of BC is the
case that fleshed out the meaning of the
Canadian Charter equality provisions in terms
of substantive equality - equality of results
rather than equality of treatment. But looking
beneath the success story of substantive
equality is revealing. Mark David Andrews
argued that the Canadian citizenship
requirements for admission to practice law
violated section 15 (1). Andrews was a white,
Oxford educated, male lawyer who remained
a British subject but was also a permanent
resident of Canada. The Supreme Court of
Canada established that s. 15 is designed to
protect those "groups who suffer social,
political and legal disadvantage in our society"
(Andrews 1989). And, following the language
of the US Supreme Court they decided that
Andrews was a "discrete and insular minority"
(US v. Carolene Products 1938, footnote 4).
Andrews is revealing when juxtaposed
against the US racial prerequisite cases. In
these cases racialized people who were
subject to social, legal and political
disadvantages, such as segregation and
racially biased jury selection, were considered
exempt from the 14th Amendment because
they were white by law (López 1996). In the
Supreme Court of Canada's decision in
Andrews a white, Oxford educated, male
lawyer was considered a "discrete and insular
minority" suffering "social, political and legal
disadvantage" (Andrews 1989). Furthermore,
the Andrews Court then reiterated the opinion
of McLachlin J.A. (as she was then):
"discrimination not to be tolerated in
peacetime" could include "the internment of
enemy aliens..." (as cited in Andrews, 1989).
This type of discrimination is what led to the
interment of Japanese Canadians during the
Second W orld W ar and it is the same
justification for the production of homo sacer
that appears in Traynor, C.J.'s 1948 opinion in
Perez. Those Canadians equally deserving of
concern, respect and consideration also
spring into being for the first time under the
Canadian Charter in Andrews.
In these cases, the norm is reinforced
by the exceptional situation and the power of
the law is reinforced through its capacity to
invoke the ban. A heteronormative couple
who can reproduce the race and a white man
of privilege become the norm but the
acceptable forms of discrimination during
times of national emergency invoke the ban.
In both the US and Canadian national stories
of democracy "W e, the People" are the
sovereign. If "W e, the People" are the
sovereign and the sovereign is homo sacer in
its capacity to invoke the state of exception,
then everybody, including those excluded
from the "W e, the People," is always already
simultaneously inside and outside the law. Is
everyone homo sacer? Is the ban the normal
and ubiquitous condition of life governed by
the constitutional order of the democratic
statist nation?  (Agamben 1998, 52-64; 2005).5
If it is and if everyone is homo sacer, what
does this mean?
W ithin the statist nation there are
different registers of the ban and thereby
degrees of citizenship. These degrees of
citizenship are not only designated through
variations in official status such as refugee
status, landed immigrant or permanent
resident status, but they are also contingent
on the characteristics that identify those who
legally qualify as full citizens. In discrimination
claims those who are recognized as citizens
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and those who can avail of social citizenship
rights can only exercise these rights to a
limited degree depending on the legislation
under review and on what is visible as a legal
right within the rights discourse of each
jurisdiction. In general, people inhabiting both
jurisdictions can only exercise their rights to
the extent that they can avoid the multiple
forms of structural violence that may not be
de jure condoned by the law as it exists on
paper, but are de facto condoned through the
absence of meaningful remedies and access
to justice. If this is true, what does
constitutional equality rights discourse have to
offer?
Producing an Anti-Subordination
Framework
Judith Butler argues that it is only
through recognition by others that people
become "socially viable beings" (Butler 2004,
2). Recognition becomes the site of power
through which people are "differentially
produced" (2004, 2 & 58). There exist
"schemes of recognition" that can "undo" the
person by both conferring and/or withholding
recognition (Butler 2004). But, what does it
mean to be undone through discourse? The
bodies constructed through rights discourse
are both subjects subjected and objects
objectified. Through deconstruction discourse
is privileged as that which constructs multiple
realities. The rights discourses that are
produced in the US and Canadian equality
jurisprudence reify physical characteristics
and grant degrees of citizenship status
through the bodies that they create. These
creations also depend on exclusions and
silences. Here is where subjectivity and
agency are possible yet constrained. Here is
where an anti-subordination framework can
be found within the fragments of the
jurisprudence that already exists. 
Meanings in those places where
discourse is codified are constantly being
reinterpreted and are thereby creating new
content. The stability and consistency of Stare
Decisis, the legal concept of precedent,
becomes a fiction. Although no one can be
emancipated from discourse, through radical
invention the schemes of recognition that
render one a socially or not socially viable
being can be altered to expand the range of
possibilities for better or worse. To withhold
recognition is still a mode of recognition.
Erasure still has presence and in the undoing
something is being done. It is therefore not
possible to become that for which there is no
place in a given regime of truth. One will
always be intelligible even if one is intelligible
as an absence, an aberration or an anomaly.
And one will always carry the traces of the
presences and absences that preceded them.
The discursive strategies used by the
courts not only police the borders of who is
included in the polity but they (re)produce and
reify single-axis categories of analysis through
the bodies of claimants. In each case identity
is under consideration in the contest over
degrees of citizenship and the register of the
ban. The courts construct and apply analytical
frameworks to discrimination claims made
under the constitutional equality provisions.
These rubrics are the rules about how to
interpret the rules. In the Canadian context
one of the steps in the equality analysis
requires the claimant to establish grounds of
discrimination from the pre-existing list
outlined in section 15 of the Charter or to
establish analogous grounds. This list is as
follows: race, national or ethnic origin, colour,
religion, sex, age or mental or physical
disability. Sexual Orientation has been read
into the Charter after Egan v. Canada and
cases have also pleaded multiple grounds
(Duclos 1993; Pothier 2001). But, as
discussed earlier, an overemphasis on
grounds can result in an over-determination of
the claimant's body and thus detract from a
consideration of the most im portant
questions. 
Dianne Pothier argues that grounds
of discrimination are necessary to "focus
a tten tion  on the  rea l sources  o f
discrimination" (Gilbert 2003, 13; Pothier
2001, 44). Nitya Duclos argues against a
grounds approach because a focus on
grounds ignores the structural and systemic
causes of discrimination at the same time as
it constructs the claimant as the problem
(Duclos 1993, 47-48; Pothier 2001, 69-70). I
follow Duclos and L'Heureux-Dubé J. insofar
as their analyses focus on the community
practices and relationships that are the sites
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where recognition happens, where power is
exercised and discrimination occurs (Duclos
1993; Gilbert 2003; L'Heureux-Dubé 1999).
Although Pothier argues for a relational
approach, my concern is that since she
published her article in 2001, the grounds
approach at the Supreme Court of Canada
has produced some very problematic
outcomes.  That said, when considering the6
equality jurisprudence from the US, it does
not seem to matter whether there are grounds
or not. The same processes of classification
occur at the US Supreme Court without a
grounds approach. Looking at Kimberly Nixon
v. Vancouver Rape Relief Society, a case that
did not make it to the Supreme Court of
Canada but relies on grounds to the detriment
of the claim, is illustrative.
Vancouver Rape Relief Society
denied Kimberly Nixon the opportunity to train
as a volunteer rape crisis counselor because
she had not been a woman since birth. In
1995 Kimberly Nixon filed a complaint on the
ground of sex discrimination. In the Nixon
decisions, Kimberly Nixon's "biological and
brain sex" became the focal points of the case
(Nixon 2002, 2003; Vancouver Rape Relief
Society 2004, 2005). To a large extent the
over-determination of her body eclipsed a
consideration of the discriminatory conduct
and its effects. Kimberly Nixon was at one
and the same time the subject of a claim and
the object of legal discourse, inside and
outside the law, standing as a representative
of a series of classifications and categories
that were reified and at times denied through
her body. The grounds approach shifted the
focus from the verb to the noun, transforming
the claim into a contest over sex/gender
taxon om y.  T h is  is  p rec ise ly wha t
L'Heureux-Dubé J. warned against in her
dissent in Egan. It is not the grounds and how
Kimberly Nixon's body fits into them that are
what Pothier refers to as "the real sources" of
the discrimination. It is, rather, the community
practices, the policies they generated and the
effects they had on Kimberly Nixon that are
sources of the discrimination. These are by
and large what were eclipsed through an
over-emphasis on grounds in these decisions.
The importance of the Nixon
decisions in the consideration of an
anti-subordination framework is nothing new:
identity categories are constructed and their
use within the context of discrimination claims
can be discriminatory in itself. The Nixon v.
Vancouver Rape Relief Society decisions,
when  juxtaposed against Perez v. Sharp,
discussed earlier, illustrate that although
Traynor C. J. still manages to exclude people
from the polity by invoking national
emergencies, his use of a deconstructive
methodology to strike down the racist sections
of the statute is much more conducive to
understanding the power dynamics of group
subordination than the repressive attempt to
categorize the claimants. 
Emphasizing the social construction
of categories alone, however, is not enough to
garner an anti-subordination analysis (López
2006, 48-52). An analysis of the court's choice
of evidence reveals that historiography is
important. The choice between competing
histories in Lawrence v. Texas is illustrative.
Fortunately for John Lawrence and Tyron
Garner, the recognition that taxonomies have
histories won. As a result the remaining state
sodomy laws that applied to conduct between
consenting adults were invalidated.
United States Supreme Court Justice
Antonin Scalia's dissent in Lawrence uses the
history and traditions approach to outline a
history and tradition of homophobia that would
uphold sodomy laws in the US. In Scalia J.'s
dissent the history and traditions argument
was used to invoke an oppressive
historiography as evidence to target same sex
couples and justify ongoing subordination.
This opinion would codify the denial of basic
social citizenship rights to people included in
the crim inalized category homosexual.
Fortunately, US Supreme Court Justice
Anthony Kennedy, writing the majority opinion
in Lawrence, cites a different history as part of
h is  rationale to f ind sodom y laws
discriminatory:
The absence of legal prohibitions focusing on
homosexual conduct may be explained in part by noting
that according to some scholars the concept of the
homosexual as a distinct category of person did not
emerge until the late 19th century...Thus early American
sodomy laws were not directed at homosexuals as such
but instead sought to prohibit nonprocreative sexual
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activity more generally...far from possessing "ancient
roots," American laws targeting same-sex couples did
not develop until the last third of the 20th century.       
                                              (Lawrence 2003)
The final two cases that I will consider
here are Hernandez v. Texas and Brown v.
Board of Education. These cases were both
decided in 1954 within two weeks of one
another. In Hernandez former US Supreme
Court Chief Justice Earl W arren creates a
framework that considers the effect(s) of
legislation com bined with com m unity
practices that can be demonstrated to
perpetuate the subordination of, and thereby
bring into existence, particular groups of
people (Hernandez 1954). The issue in this
case "was not classification, but hierarchy
(López and Olivas 2008, 303)." Hernandez
was not considered a race case because for
legal purposes in 1954 in Texas, Mexican
Americans were white and every party to this
case relied on their whiteness to bolster their
respective arguments. For example, the
League of United Latin American Citizens
(LULAC) agued that the segregation of
Mexican Americans was inappropriate
because they were white. The lower courts
also used the legal classification of Mexican
Americans as white to establish that the 14th
Amendment was not applicable (López 2006,
44). W arren C. J., however, offered a
two-step analytical framework asking: 1) does
the group exist as a "distinct class" and 2)
was the "differential treatment" unreasonable
(Hernandez 1954; López and Olivas 2008,
290)? Rather than trying to determine whether
or not Mexican Americans constituted a racial
group, W arren C.J. focused on evidence
pointing to a history of group subordination in
the community. In doing so, W arren C.J.
produced an inquiry into how the group came
into being under "social practices of group
subordination (López and Olivas 2008, 290)."
López argues that Hernandez and
Brown should be read together in order to
establish race conscious remedies (López
and Olivas 2008). Brown is widely held to be
the landmark desegregation case in the US.
But critics such as López and Olivas argue
that without considering the decision in
Hernandez, Brown read alone is more often
than not m isread. In Brown I the Court
explicitly states: "[t]he most avid proponents
of the post-W ar Amendments undoubtedly
intended them to remove all legal distinctions
among 'all persons born or naturalized in the
United States'" (Brown I 1954). Here is where
interpretation can lead to an analysis that
applies only to racial classifications and that if
no such classifications exist in the legislation,
discrimination cannot be found. In the
converse situation every classification,
including those in the interest of affirmative
action, are rendered suspect (López and
Olivas 2008). Although the meaningful
integration of the public school system did not
accelerate until after the Civil Rights Act of
1964 was implemented, in Brown II the
W arren Court articulated a remedy that
required the expenditure of public resources
(Brown II 1955). 
Challenges to the current conditions
of intelligibility across jurisdictions would
require a framework that is capable of
recognizing and naming discrimination what it
is: subordination. An anti-subordination
framework would combine the remedies
found in Brown II with the community
practices analysis found in Hernandez. It
would include the deconstruction in Sharp and
the historiography found in Kennedy J.'s
opinion in Lawrence v. Texas . And finally, it
would consider discrimination from the
relational standpoint found in L'Heureux-Dubé
J.'s dissent in Egan with the substantive
equality found in Andrews. 
Conclusion
Foucault argues: "history transforms
documents into monuments" (Foucault 1972,
6). In the context of equality cases these
monuments bring Constitutions to life. Traces
of these stories, this cast of reified categories
and historical characters, these truths, tests,
presences in  s ilence, den ia ls  and
emergencies can be heard elsewhere in the
respective equality jurisprudence of each
jurisdiction. The use of specific phrases and
citations combined with similar reasoning
enables traces of all of these cases to bleed
across time and geographic location. Using
Foucault's methodology it is possible to
identify them. 
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"W e, the People" are the sovereign in
the fantasy of democracy and the courts are
the spaces where the state (re)produces the
nation. The interpretation of the equality
guarantees enshrined in the respective
Constitutions under consideration here are at
the nexus of power, discipline and
sovereignty. I f  an anti-subordination
framework could be put to work it cannot
begin and end with only the consideration of
the effects of the legislation or the
extra-juridical practices of any given
community. It must begin in the adjudication
process itself. 
Endnotes
1. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms,
Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.),
1982, c. 11.
2. See Gosselin v. Quebec (Attorney General)
[2002] S.C.R. 429 (the overemphasis on age
led to the conclusion that forcing people to live
on under $200/month was an affirmation of
the dignity of people under 30. They failed to
consider gender when women were trading
their sexuality for food and following through
with unplanned and unwanted pregnacies);
Auton (Guardian a litem of) v. British
Columbia A G  [2004] 3 S.C.R. 657 (One of
the reasons the Court denied autistic children
access to therapies was because they chose
the wrong comparator group and thereby
failed to establish the appropriate ground).
3. Funes the Memorious is a story where
Borges fictionalizes himself and his meeting
with Ireneo Funes. Funes is a person who
cannot think in abstraction or make
generalizations. He spends his days learning
Latin, recounting descriptions of the houses
that surround him and inventing artificial
languages and counting systems that give
every numeral up to 24,000 arbitrary names.
4. This was a Supreme Court case that held
compulsory sterilization for criminals to be
unconstitutional.
5. I am using Foucault's terminology rather
than nation state. 
6. See note 2.
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